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this action has brought himself within the terms of section
counts be regarded as subsisting, the result is that the consideration was furnished by the grantor.
[4] Oorporations-Disregard of Oorporate Entity-When Proper.
-The consequences that ordinarily follow the observance of
the separate identity of a. corporation .andthe persons who
compose it are disregarded when it is necessary to protect
the rights of third persons or to prevent injustice. The rule
is applicable where members of a family are directors of a
corporation, where they recl;live salaries from a subsidiarycor~
poration which they deposit in. bank accounts of the corporation and which, aside from amounts drawn out in cash!
are expended for household expenses, and where pending an
action arising out of a fraudulent sale of stock in a subsidiary a quitclaim deed is executed by tli'tj corporation to the
mother, the purported consideration being the cancell!1tion of
gratuitous assignments of amounts owing from the corporation to the children, the assignors.
[5] Vendor-Bona Fide Purchasers-Mortgagee.-A mortgagee
.acquires no security when the mortgagor is without title by
reason of the fact that the deed to him did not comply with
Civ. Code, § 1096, relating to deeds by grantors who have
changed their names.

708 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitling him to the relief therein provided. This question is not before us in the
present instance and cannot. properly be determined until
the defendants have had an opportunity to put in such defense as they may have to the motion of plaintiff to have
said judgment revived.
It follows that the order denying the motion of the defendants to vacate the order of June 9, 1938, was erroneous
and should be reversed, and it is so ordered.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
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[So F. No. 16711. In Bank. JUly 16, 1942.J
ALBERTO PUCCETTI, Plaintiff ; GEMMA PUCCETTI, as
Administratrix, etc. (Substituted Plaintiff), Appellant,
v. MADELINE GIROLA et al., Respondents.
a,'~

[lJ Deeds - Grantors - Designation on Ohange of Name. _ Noncompliance with Civ. Code, § 1096, requiring a grantor who
has changed his name to set forth the name in which he
derived title, renders the deed void, even as to a subsequent
purchaser who had notice of the change in name.
[2J Executions-Right of Purchasers-Bona Fide Purchasers_
Notice. - Notwithstanding the invalidity of a deed, if the
grantee paid value for the conveyance, he has an equity in
the land that takes priority over the rights of a subsequent
purchaser at an execution sale with notice of his interest.
[3J Fraudulent Oonveyances-Evidence-Oonsideration._A finding that certain deeds were not entirely voluntary is without
SUpport in the evidence where it appears that the purported
consideration therefor was the cancellation by the grantee
of gratuitous assignments of accounts previously marked
"closed" presumably because valueless, or where, if the ac.[2J See 11 Oal. Jur. 123; 21 Am. Jur. 156.
[3, 4] See 6A Oal. Jur. 80.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Deeds, § 13; [2] Executions, § 101;
[3] Fraudulent Conveyances, § 107; [4J Corporations, § 6;
[5J Vendor and Purchaser, § 369 (5).

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County. Warren V. Tryon, JUdge.assigned. Reversed.
Action to quiet title. Judgment for defendants and for
cross-complainant reversed.
Jesse G. Benson for Appellant.
John J. Beck, Altman & Ellis, JohnC. Altman andWn.
lard L. Ellis, Donahue, Richards & Hamlin and A.R. Rowell
for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On April 21, 1931, Alberto Puccetti commenced an action against Girola Bros., a corporation, Henry
Girola, its president and sole stockholder, and others for
fraudulently inducing him to purchase stock in a subsidiary
corporation. Before that suit was filed, Girola Bros. had
changed its name to Madalay, Inc., and while the .action was .
pending, it conveyed by quitclaim deeds certain real property to defendant Madeline Girola, a director of Girola Bros.
and the mother of Henry Girola. The deeds, recorded by
Madeline Girola, set forth Madala;}', Inc., as grantor, but
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failed to set forth the name in which Madalay Inc. derived
title to the realty as required by section 1096 of the Civil
Code. On November 1, 1933, ,Puccetti obtained a judgment,
and on JUly 9, 1937, recorded an abstract thereof and a writ
of execution levying upon all the right, title, and interest
of the judgment dcbtors in the property. On August 18,
1937, Madeline Girola executed a mortgage on the property
to defendant State Finance Company which recorded it on
October 8, 1937. On November 8, 1937, Puccetti purchased
the land at an execution sale and on that day recorded the
sheriff's certificate of salc. On December 9,1938, he recorded the
sheriff's deed conveying the property to him. He then
brought this action to quiet title to the land, claiming that
the conveyance to Madeline Girola was void because it failed
to comply with section 1096 of the Civil Code and because
it was in fraud of creditors.
The trial court made findings in favor of defendants and
granted the cross-complaint of Madeline Girola, quieting title
in her. Puccetti has appealed from the judgment. Following his death during the pendency of the appeal, his ad:rw.nistratrix, Gemma Puccetti, was substituted as plaintiff and
appellant.
[1J It is admitted that the conveyance from Madalay Inc.
to Madeline Girola failed to comply with section 1096 of tne
Civil Code, providing "Any person in whom the title of rflal
estate is vested, who shall afterwards, from any cause, have
his or her name changed, must in any conveyance of said rflal
estate so held, set forth the name in which he or she derived
title to said real estate." Appellant contends that the .J.'equirements of this section are mandatory and that a deed in
Violation thereof does not pass legal title. Respondents argue
that the section must be construed to have the same effect as
the recording statutes embodied in sections 1213-1218 of tine
Oivil Code, so that a conveyance in disregard thereof can be
attacked only by a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer
for value without notice of the change of name by the original owner.
Section 1096 was originally enacted in 1874 following a
.suggestion of the court in Fallon v. Kehoe, 38 Cal. 44 [99
Am. Dec. 347J. In that case, land had been conveyed to
Jeremiah l<'allon ill his nickname, Darby 0 'Fallon. He conveyed the land in his true name before the enactment of the
recording act, and following its enactment he made another

conveyance in the name under which he had derived title.
In a suit between the successive grantees, 'the court held that
the first grantee was entitled to prevail under the common
law rule that whatever the name in which the true owner
conveyed the property, the conveyances as between grantor
and grantee transferred the title. Recordation of the first
deed was held to be constructive notice to subsequent purchasers even though a search of the record would not have
disclosed the earlier deed, which was out of the grantor's
chain of title.
'
Section 1096 seeks to prev~nt any opportunity for fraud
in comparable situations by requiring a grantor who conveys
land by a name other than that in which he derived title
to recite the change of name in the conveyance. It thus abrogates the common-law rule relied upon in t~Fallon case
by precluding any conveyance that would appear in the
record as a "wild deed" from. giving rise to multiple chains
of title. Its language is mandatory and nowhere suggests
that compliance is excused when a subsequent purchaser
has notice of the change in name. It was placed' in the chapter entitled "Transfers of Real Property' i and grouped with
4~ other sections under the heading "Mode of Transfer. i, Section 1095 in the same chapter provides in similar language
that "When an attorney in fact executes an. instrument
transferring an estate in real property, he must subscribe
the name of the principal to it, and his Own name as attorney
in fact," and it has been held that failure to follow the man~
date of that section renders a deed void. (Morrison v. Bow-'
man, 29 Cal. 337; Mitchell v. Benjamin Franklin Bonding
& Indemnity Corp., 13 Cal. App. (2d) 447 [57 P. (2d) 185].)
The deeds from Madalay, 1M. to Madeline Girola were
therefore inoperative to pass legal title;' and title remained
in the grantor corporation in the absence of a reformation of the deeds to comply with CiVil dode section
1096 or of an adjUdication of the identity of the grantor
under' section 751(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The property was thus subject to Puccetti's levy of
execution and passed to him by Virtue' of the sheriff's
sale and deed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 700; Freelon v. A.drian,
161 Cal. 13 .. 18 [118 Pac. 220J.) [2] Had Madeline Girola
paid value for the conveyance, she would have an equity in
the land that would take priority over the rights of a subseso O.
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quent purchaser at an execution sale with notice of her interest. (Whitney v. Sherman, 178 Cal. 435 [173 Pac. 931];
Riley v. Martinelli, 97 Cal. 575 [32 Pac. 579, 33 Am. St. Rep.
209, 21 L. R. A. 33]. Sec, also, caSes cited in 11 Cal. Jur.,
p. 123.) [3, 4] 'rhe trial court's finding, however, that the
deeds to Madeline Girola were not entirely voluntary is without support in the evidence, which presents no confllct. Both
Madeline Girola, the grantee, and ,Josephine Girola, secretary
of the grantor corporation, testified that no money was paid
and no property transferred by the £rr:llltce in consideration
of the conveyance. The claimed consideration was alleged to
have arisen from the following' transaction: Henry, Joseph,
and Josephine Girola, who were all members of the Girola
family and directors of Girola Bros., received salaries from
a subsidiary corporation, which they deposited in the bank
acconnts of Girola Bros. A large part of this money they
drew out in cash, and another part of the money was expended by the corporation for the household expenses of
members of the family. The books of the corporation' showed
that it owed them, at one time, a total of $54,523.46. All
these accounts, however, were marked as closed on January
1, 1932. On April 28, 1932, the parties met in the office of
their lawyer, where Henry, J oscph, and Josephine Girola
executed gratuitous assignments to their mother, Madeline
Girola, of the amounts that the books sho,Yed the corporation owed them. Madeline Girola immedintely" executed a
canceilation in favor of Madalay, Inc. of thc amounts r:o
assigned and received a conveynnce of the property. Since
the accounts assigned to Madeline Oirola were marked
closed several months before the purported assignments they
were presumably valueless, and their cancellation would not
constitute consideration for the deeds. Mort~over, even if
these accounts had been SUbsisting the cOlLSideration would
have been furnished in substance and effect by the grantor.
The consequences that ordinarily follow the observance of
the separate identity of a corporation and the persons who
compose it are disregarded when it is necessary to protect
the rights of third persons or to prevent injustice. (D. N. &; E.
Walter &; Co. v. Zuckerman, 214: Cal. 418 [6 P. (2d) 251,
79 A. L. R. 329] ; Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal
675 [227 Pac. 723] ; Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481 [202 Pac.
673]. See, also, cases cited in 6A Cal. JUl'. 80.) The presence
of a colorable consideration does not alter the nature of the
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transaction or the fact that Madeline Girola failed to give
value for the deeds.
•
[5] The parties stipulated that a lien asserted by the defendant Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association and arising from a deed of trust executed by Girola
Bros. before the transactions involved herein is a good' and
subsisting licn and that it will remain so regardless of the
outcome of this action. Defendant State Finance Company
also asserts a lien by virtue of a mortgage executed by Madeline Girola after the alleged conveyance to her by Madalay,
Inc. Since Madeline Girola acquired no interest in the property, however, the finance company acquired no security for
its mortgage. (Tr01tf v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 652 [32 P. (2d)
968] ; Promis v. Dnkc, 208 Cal. 420 [281 Pac. 613] ; Gould
v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532 [32 Pac. 576, 33 Pac. 323].) The finance
company dealt with :Madeline Girola at its own risk except
for the protection offered by the record, and a search wonId
have revealed no predecessor in interest of record to Madeline Girola's grantor, an omission that would put a prri<aent
. .
(
person on lllqUlry.
The judgment is reversed.
i."-

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Respondent Girola's petition for a rehearing was denied
August 10, 1942.

[L. A. No. 18265. In Bank.

July 16, 1942.]

M. L. LYONS et al., ",1.ppeUants, v. THE BRUNSWICKBALKE-COLLENDER COMPANY (a Corporation) et
al., Respondents.
[la, Ib] Venue - Change of Venue - Waiver. - The right to a
ehange of pbee of trial to t.he county of a defendant's residence is not waived where, when a codefendant demanded a
transfer to n county adjoining that in which the defendant
resided, he filed a consent to such chanr,c, and where within
a week following the dismissal of the nction as to the codeMcK. Dig. References:
[3] Waiver, § 11.

[1] Venue, § 35; [2] Venue, § 28;
"
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